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CyberDefenders - IcedID

Created: 08/10/2024 13:27 Last Updated: 08/10/2024 21:37


Category: Threat Intel


Scenario: A cyber threat group was identified for initiating widespread phishing campaigns to distribute further malicious payloads. The most frequently encountered payloads were IcedID. You have been given a hash of an IcedID sample for the purpose of analyzing and monitoring the activities of this advanced persistent threat (APT) group.

Tools: - VirusTotal - malpedia - X


Questions

Q1: What is the name of the file associated with the given hash?

0cb6a3aaae507905213fbd75b772e080.png

This challenge only provided us with 1 hash so we can start by submit this on VirusTotal and go to "Details" which also keep tracks of file name of this hash

Answer

document-1982481273.xlsm

Q2: Can you identify the filename of the gif file that was deployed?

be50e4a02cdaddf074ed1ead5d764430.png

Now we can go to "Relations" tab, which we can see that there is 1 filename keep getting requests from multiple domains.

9ac4e7b5d001ea02d4f96a86735599f6.png Go to Dropped Files section and we can see that gif file is also a malicious file and its actually malicious dll file (second payload) after this xlsm macro was opened by a user.

Answer

3003.gif

Q3: How many domains does the malware look to download the additional payload file in Q2?

be50e4a02cdaddf074ed1ead5d764430.png Count all domains hosting this gif file then we will have 5 different domains in total.

Answer

5

Q4: What is the MD5 hash of the executable in Q2 downloaded from metaflip.io?

403f3225b3dd2c070c963848cd26cf53.png This part is a little bit tricky here since this domain communicated with a lot of malicious files (all different hashes)

4711732b30471f426726a9c2a92dd468.png

Which I lost 20 attempts before getting it right.. so how did I get the right answer?

7818f79470d6d135a1eaf88a2bb6593f.png

I looked back at the tool recommended on this lab that included X so I searched on X about this ioc

Which I found that Joe Roosen actually posted this IOC on X at 31st March 2021

5e796614313f2189cf2570553f5fee48.png

He also included any.run and tria.ge report that we can follow and find out more about how this malware operated on these sandboxes.

5fc90c19fcd4a9dca22574f8d691ecdb.png

Then I fellow to any.run report then found that this report send HTTP GET request to metaflip.io to download malicious executable in Q2

77e2ddd14d15965f39390d31416b8826.png

Click the "executable" Content of HTTP Request then we will have MD5 of this file right here

Answer

964a0015332ec2cc13ab12b8d85f29ff

Q5: From the domains mentioned in Q3, a DNS registrar was predominantly used by the threat actor to host their harmful content, enabling the malware's functionality. Can you specify the Registrar INC?

1aa20f037949fe03f7e910b4e79423ab.png

Go back to VirusTotal then we will see that there is only 1 registrar INC that matches answer format which is NameCheap that let anyone hosting there domain in reasonable price so many threat actors use this to register their C2.

Answer

NAMECHEAP

Q6: Could you specify the threat actor linked to the sample provided?

461f79bf3596a81d0830d1ee90e03352.png

For this one, I went to MITRE ATT&CK and searched for IcedID software and after scrolling down to find out which group using this software then we can see that there is only 1 group which is TA551.

bbd260798b96ebe0892612541cb3602f.png

Which is also known as Gold Cabin

Answer

GOLD CABIN

Q7: In the Execution phase, what function does the malware employ to fetch extra payloads onto the system?

12cb331c00191dfaaaa8adcab3f61391.png This one, we have to dig into tria.ge report then we can see that it used this function from Windows API to download 3003.gif from 5 different domains.

Answer

URLDownloadToFile

dac26bd2c2ec1b03f56e8ea0162432b1.png